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ABSTRACT  
   
There has been an ongoing debate between the relative deterrent power of 
certainty and severity on deceptive and criminal activity, certainty being the likelihood of 
capture and severity being the magnitude of the potential punishment. This paper is a 
review of the current body of research regarding risk assessment and deception in games, 
specifically regarding certainty and severity. The topics of game theoretical foundations, 
balance, and design were covered, as were heuristics and individual differences in 
deceptive behavior. Using this background knowledge, this study implemented a 
methodology through which the risk assessments of certainty and severity can be 
compared behaviorally in a repeated conflict context. It was found that certainty had a 
significant effect on a person’s likelihood to lie, while severity did not. Exploratory data 
was collected using the dark triad personality quiz, though it did not ultimately show a 
pattern. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal justice research has identified two key dimensions in crime deterrence: 
certainty, the likelihood a deceptive behavior will be detected, and severity, the size of 
the punishment incurred. The relative power of each of these dual risk factors has been 
the topic of debate among criminological research for quite some time, as it would be 
valuable to know where to focus efforts in preventing criminal behaviors. This paper 
explores these two factors of risk in the context of a game. 
  The research question, whether the likelihood of discovery or the penalty upon 
capture is greater at preventing deception, is most closely related to the areas of heuristic 
reasoning and game theory. Heuristic reasoning is the theory that humans use cognitive 
shortcuts to supplement decision making, which give more weight to certain options over 
others. An example of this would be the bias due to retrievability; when asked to judge 
the relative size of two sets of pictures, one picturing males and the other females; it was 
found that participants would erroneously recall the group with more famous people as 
the larger group (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). If a bias exists towards certainty or 
severity exists when weighing benefits versus consequences, it may be due to some form 
of heuristic. Game theory provides a framework and a set of guiding practices for 
development.  
Individual differences play a key component in deception, so an evaluation of 
these was pursued as exploratory data. The Short Dark Triad is a validated index of three 
antisocial personality traits known as Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. 
Machiavellianism is the manipulative trait, Narcissism is characterized by elevated self-
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image, while Psychopathy represents those high impulse and low empathy (Paulhus and 
Williams, 2002). Of these, Machiavellianism and Psychopathy are of particular interest 
given their relationship to deception. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
Certainty and Severity 
According to classical deterrence theory three attributes must be present to deter 
behavior: the actor knows that the punishment exists, there is a high risk (real or 
perceived) of being caught, and the consequences upon being caught are of a high enough 
severity (Wikstrom, 2007). The effect certainty and severity have on illegal activity has 
been extensively studied within the criminal justice field, though the science is far from 
settled. A large body of empirical studies across the literature conclude that certainty has 
a greater weight than severity in deterring criminal acts (Witte, 1980; Grogger 1991), a 
small body that suggests that opposite relationship in some situations (Silberman 1976), 
and yet other studies that have found support for equal weighting (Mendes 2004).  
Just as the conclusions drawn by different researchers differ, a grappling tension 
exists in the methodologies employed; cross sectional and longitudinal research each 
have their advocates. There are two main issues with cross sectional design, temporal 
order and unwanted influence on the dependent variable (Paternoster, 1987). The 
problem of temporal order is this: our perceptions and morality are altered by what we 
do. (Greenberg, 1981) This interferes with cross sectional design, as researchers assume 
that perceptual stability exists (Paternoster, 1987). Unwanted influence simply includes 
the many variables that may influence a person’s perception of risk, social, moral, etc. In 
order to test the perceptual stability hypothesis, Paternoster took data previously collected 
twice from 300 college students with a year in between. Participants were asked for their 
certainty and severity of punishment for a variety of crimes, including their own personal 
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certainty of a hypothetical capture for each crime. He found that among petty theft, 
marijuana use, writing bad checks, and vandalism, over half had a new perception of risk 
at the second testing, aside from marijuana use which only 42% changed on. The study 
concludes that the deterrent effects are only significant for marijuana use, and only by a 
small amount. Those who committed petty theft, bad check writing, and vandalism 
between the two poling dates had significantly lower estimates of risk than those who did 
not commit crimes. Marijuana use was the standout with a larger proportion of raised risk 
perception. These results suggest to us that perceptions changes as a result of behavior 
and that different scenarios skew these perceptions in different ways.  
In a similar vein to Paternoster’s critique of cross-sectional design, Mendes is 
similarly unimpressed with aggregate level deterrence studies and empiricists (Mendes, 
2004). Aggregate studies cover only the objective aspects of decision making and not 
individual level deterrence. However, these aggregate studies claim to support Becker’s 
model of risk prone criminality (Becker, 1968). Her argument is that we should 
theoretically not expect a greater weight between certainty or severity. Further, Mendes 
(2004) suggests that criminals are actually risk neutral. 
Jacobs and Piquero cover another complicating feature of certainty and severity, 
boundary crossing, the degree to which certainty and severity interfere or interact with 
each other. (2013). To do this they used drunk driving scenarios with high and low 
certainty and severity conditions, which participants would to respond to in a five-minute 
survey asking them for a probability that they would get caught and how much of a 
problem the punishment would be if they were caught. In the first analysis they found 
that almost all objective certainty and severity combinations had very little effect on 
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subjective certainty and severity. A second analysis using a model to predict drinking 
intentions found that certainty was a more consistently effective inhibitor than severity. 
Perceptual certainty acts as an inhibitor only in the low certainty/high severity condition, 
while perceptual severity does the same only in the low/low condition. The authors 
suggest that there is a “cognitive sleight of hand” wherein severity and certainty become 
muddled. 
Active observable cheating was examined by Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) in the 
context of a quiz. The quiz was administered to university students after they had spent 
much of the 45-minute session on a filler packet of material. Participants were told they 
would be given a $10 reward for answering six questions correctly. The quiz was 
designed so this would not be possible by guessing. Before doing the quiz, participants 
were told that an answer sheet existed in their materials that they could look at after they 
had completed the quiz. Participants who passed the quiz were measured as having 
cheated because they would have had to look at the answer key. Certainty was controlled 
by the presence of a test facilitator, while the severity was controlled by the existence of a 
penalty in the form of forfeiture of the studies non-bonus payment. They found that 
certainty had a greater effect than severity.  
According to the literature, both the proper methods used to study certainty and 
severity as well as the results gained from those methods are sources of contention. 
However, the majority view appears to be that certainty is a greater deterrent of antisocial 
behavior than severity.  Crucially, the behavioral study highlighted in this review 
supports the majority. Therefore, it was reasonable to hypothesize that the behavioral 
study conducted for this paper would reach a similar conclusion. 
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Heuristics and Bias 
In their seminal piece Kahneman and Tversky proposed that humans use heuristic 
principles to reduce the complexity of judgements under uncertainty (1974). The initial 
set of heuristics proposed were those of representativeness, availability, and adjustment, 
and anchoring. The representativeness heuristic is categorization based on characteristics, 
availability is the preference for easily retrieved concepts, while the adjustment and 
anchoring heuristic is the tendency to make conservative adjustments from an initial 
value. Heuristics are often framed by Kahneman in a problematic context; fast but 
illogical shortcuts that are harmful to good decision making. Morewedge and Kahneman 
(2010) describe two systems involved in processing; system 1 and system 2. System 1 
involves fast intuitive judgements, whereas system 2 involves slow deliberate processing. 
The paper frames judgement errors as a failure of system 1 through bias, and as a failure 
of system 2 in its role as a filter. It should be noted that this approach has seen criticism; 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that biases are every bit as useful as a logical 
approach but simply made to solve a different set of problems. Heuristics form a toolbox 
of efficient methods to generate judgements and are in some cases more accurate than 
logical counterparts. Risk assessment has been found to be particularly prone to bias and 
can be induced to varying degrees of magnitude through the way risk ratios are presented 
or compared to one another (Reyna & Breynerd, 2007). Research also suggests that 
people overestimate the likelihood of detection but will lower that estimation after being 
caught (Piquero, Piquero, Gertz, Bratton, Loughran, 2012). In general, people are very 
bad at making objective risk assessments; objective risk has little effect on perceived risk 
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according (Jacobs & Piquero, 2013). This could explain why research has found 
disparities between certainty and severity; people may have a bias towards one aspect of 
risk over the other, even when the sum-total of risk in two situations is the same. 
Game theory 
Game theory is a framework for studying the ways that individual decision 
makers affect each other that can be applied to a wide variety of models (Dufwenberg, 
2011). For instance, the “Nicktacs” outlined later in this paper would be described as a 
finite, two player, constant sum, imperfect information game (Davis & Brams, 2017). A 
very common game model is that of the prisoner’s dilemma (Dufwemberg, 2011). In the 
prisoner’s dilemma, two players are separated by a wall with two buttons labeled 
cooperate and betray. If both players choose to cooperate, they both get one year in 
prison. If one betrays and the other cooperates, the betrayer gets goes free and the 
cooperator gets three years. If both betray, both players get two years. This point 
distribution can be seen in Table 1. Depending upon the distribution of points or years, a 
dominant strategy may emerge; in this example the dominant strategy is to always betray, 
as the betraying will always result in a better outcome regardless of the other players 
choice.  
 
Coop Betray 
Coop Both get 1 year Goes free, other gets 3 years 
Betray Goes free, other gets 3 years Both get 2 years 
         Table 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
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The dominant strategy will change depending on the points distribution and whether the 
game is repeated multiple times. When the game is repeated, a much more cooperative 
strategy called tit for tat becomes the dominant (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Whereas 
the prisoner’s dilemma is useful for modeling cooperative systems such as international 
politics, it lacks a certainty dimension and so can only model the effects of varying levels 
of severity. This made it unable to address the research question, however the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma provides a dimension that was desirable to the design of the method; 
it involves a campaign of repeated deceptions and allows for complex behaviors to be 
modeled over time. Much of deception in the real world is rapid and low latency in the 
same way as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Scams for instance involve a series of lies 
that combine to deceive a target; a scammer calls a person with an initial lie about trouble 
with a credit card, then must make another series of lies to build rapport and convince 
their victim. Meanwhile the victim must ask probing questions to ascertain whether the 
caller is legitimate. Cyber warfare also involves iterative situations, where an attacker 
will probe for weaknesses through a series of calculated lies while the defender probes 
interactions and sets traps for attackers. The methodology used in this study replicated 
this aspect in its design by being similarly iterative.  
Individual differences 
When it comes to deceptive games, few have the clout or popularity of poker, and 
as such there are a number of studies based on it. Seale and Steven (2010) conducted a 
study in which participants played against a computer in a simplified poker game. In one 
condition the computer plays optimally, in the other it plays in such a way as to exploit 
poor play. Their hypothesis was that the participants would learn optimal play faster 
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when exposed to the exploitive condition. They found that neither condition lead to 
significant improvement even after 200 repetitions; bluffing was too infrequent, whereas 
calling was too frequent. The study showed that there were significant individual 
differences between players. This is in line with a study involving poker and 
Machiavellianism conducted by Palomäki, Yan, and Laakasuo (2016). They found that 
participants who measured for high distrust for others made larger bluffs on average, 
whereas those with a high desire for control had a higher frequency of bluffing. Neither 
of these papers address certainty and severity, however they do give insight into what a 
bluffing game could expect to see; a minimal or nonexistent increase improvement in 
play across games over time, and wide individual differences between players. A study 
by Jones and Paulhus (2017) investigated cheating and the dark triad in several studies. 
Of the relevant studies, one found that when given the opportunity to lie for a reward 
while the risk of capture is low, all three of the dark triad personality traits were 
predictive. When faced with the same game but a high risk of being caught, only those 
scoring high in psychopathy would cheat under normal conditions. Both high 
Machiavellianism and psychopathy were both predictive of intentional lies, a deliberate 
and direct lie to an experimenter. Because of this it would be expected that those that 
score highly on the dark triad in Machiavellianism and or psychopathy will have a higher 
rate of lying in general. 
Individual differences are also highly relevant in a criminal justice setting. Income 
is a significant indicator in likelihood of arrest, for instance Grogger found that a $100 
increase in earnings lowered the likelihood of arrest by a little less than one percent 
(1991). Similarly, psychopathy, categorized by callousness in concert with low self-
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control, has been correlated with an individual’s intention to commit white collar crime 
(Hare & Neumann, 2008). As a final consideration, it has been shown that both 
individual characteristics and the type of crime affect whether a person would be deterred 
(Wikstrom et al., 2011). For instance, some people simply do not see crime as a viable 
alternative to other actions, meaning deterrence has nothing to do with their lack of 
criminal activity. 
Hypothesis 
While still up for debate, the majority view within the literature is that certainty 
has a greater effect than severity in deterring antisocial activity. The hypothesis for this 
study was the same, that certainty will have a significant effect on a person’s level of 
deceptions and that severity will have a smaller effect. Results from this study add to the 
current body of certainty and severity research by examining the relationship in a 
repeated deception context. Findings from this study could guide resource allocation, 
provide insight allowing for further study, and create a starting point for behavioral 
modeling. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited for this study through the ASU SONA pool, 
through fliers posted on the ASU Polytechnic and Tempe campuses, and word of mouth. 
Participants were granted course credits for their time at the rate of 1 credit per hour, or 
$10 cash at their discretion. Of the 30 participants, only two took credit. Nine of the 
participants were observed to be female, 21 were observed to be male. Demographic data 
was not taken as a self-report, however most appeared college aged and participants were 
required to be over 18 to participate. 
Materials 
 Game boards and instructions for Nictacs were printed on white printer paper. 
Mancala marbles were used as game tokens. A cardboard box roughly 3x2ft in size was 
used as a divider. Data were recorded on a clipboard. The short dark triad questionnaire 
was used to asses participant’s levels of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy 
(Jones & Paulhus 2014). Jolly Ranchers and Tootsie Rolls were used as game rewards, 
with one candy given for every ten points earned by the player across all games. 
Design  
The study used a 2x2 mixed design with certainty and severity as the two factors 
and the dark triad personality scores as exploratory data. Participants were tasked with 
playing four versions of a turn based bluffing game (Nictacs) akin to the board game 
“Battleship” in which deception is rewarded but carries risk. Measures included the total 
number of deceptions, number of times called, whether each deception is called. The 
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variables were the four combinations of certainty and severity, and the ratio of lies per 
hit. Each of the four combinations of high and low certainty and severity is represented 
by variations on the base game of Nictacs. Randomized partial counterbalancing was 
used to assign game orders to each set of participants, meaning that each participant 
experienced the conditions in a different order than the others.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to give written consent. The two participants were 
assigned as player 1 or 2 using a coin flip. This assignment was used to decide who takes 
the first turn in the game as well as to deidentify the data. Each participant was then given 
10 minutes to read through the rules of the game. The players were then walked through a 
few turns of a mock version of the game and were prompted to ask questions about points 
of confusion. The participants then played through the full bluffing game, taking 
approximately 30 minutes. They were then given 10 minutes to fill out the dark triad 
questionnaire. At the end of testing each player was given a candy reward, each picking 
out one candy from a pile for each sum of 10 points earned during the game. The full 
procedure took approximately an hour. 
Nictacs 
Each player had a 10x1 grid that is hidden from the opponent, much like 
Battleship, and each square in the grid is marked with the letters A through J. The game 
is taken in turns, with roles alternating between the caller and the receiver. To start a turn, 
the receiver places a marker on a square on their board. The caller then states a number of 
letters, 7 letters in the high certainty condition and 3 letters in the low certainty condition. 
If one of the letters matched the marker on the receiver’s board, this is a hit. The receiver 
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then announces whether any of the stated letters matched the marker they placed, 
however if it was a hit they could lie about it. The shooter was then given the choice to 
believe the receiver’s statement or call it as a bluff. The receiver’s board was then 
revealed. Players were then awarded a number of points, Y, depending on the outcome 
and condition, with Y = 3 in the low severity conditions and 7 in high severity conditions. 
A confirmed hit on the receiver awarded the shooter Y points, an incorrect call deducted Y 
points from the shooter and awarded Y points to the receiver, and an uncalled lie awarded 
Y points to the receiver and no points to the shooter. Players were instructed not to give a 
false positive, i.e., say it was a hit when it was really a miss. Table 2 shows each of the 
five potential paths and their point allocations. When a turn is completed the roles 
reversed and the receiver became the shooter. When each player had been the shooter 10 
times, the condition switches to the next in the order with each player will be the shooter 
40 times across the whole game. At the end of the game each participant receives one 
piece of candy for every 10 points earned. One researcher recorded each of the game’s 80 
turns on a spreadsheet, specifically whether the shooter hit, whether the receiver bluffed 
or told the truth, and whether the shooter called a bluff or not. 
Hit or Miss Truth or Lie Trust or Call Shooter Receiver 
Hit Lie Trust 0 +Y 
Hit Lie Call +Y -Y 
Hit Truth N/A +Y 0 
Miss Truth Call -Y +Y 
Miss Truth Trust 0 0 
Table 2. Point allocation sheet 
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This design was chosen for a host of reasons. Unlike games like poker, Nictacs 
has very simple rules that allow for easy data collection. The simplicity also made it easy 
to learn, whereas a harder game may have prevented the use of strategy by overwhelming 
the participants. Unlike a prisoner’s dilemma style game, the use of a 10-space board 
allowed for control over the likelihood of a hit. For instance, in low certainty conditions 
the likelihood of hitting was 3/10, while in high it was 7/10. As certainty and severity are 
not translatable into each other, it was decided that the best way to allow for comparison 
between the two would be to ensure that the same number of possible points were 
available in the low high and high low conditions. If a player hits the average of three hits 
per game in the low certainty high severity condition, and the opponent does not lie at all, 
the player gets 21 points. Likewise, in the High Low condition hitting the average of 
seven times at three points each nets 21 points. Three and seven were chosen for the high 
and low certainty and severity conditions because the neighboring paired numbers posed 
potential issues. The concern with using two and eight as values would be that effects 
would be obscured by extreme conditions. Only receiving an average of two lying 
opportunities per match in the low certainty condition may have increased error. Four and 
eight were also considered as values, however they had the opposite problem; with only a 
20% difference between conditions, the concern was that participants would not evaluate 
them as significantly different. This left three and seven as the logical choice. 
Players were instructed to never lie when the opponent missed. Preventing false 
positives this way allows for certainty to be controlled, and also fits closer to a real-world 
scenario; a person is not likely to say that they lied when they actually told the truth. A 
point penalty had to be implemented for incorrect calls, otherwise there would be no 
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reason not to call every single time. Allowing each player to see each other was intended 
to simulate the social context that deceptive behaviors may take place in. Revealing the 
board each round was intended to facilitate rapid play. Allowing the player to place their 
marker wherever they choose rather than being randomly assigned a space to place their 
token each turn was chosen to allow for strategy. Candy was used as a reward so that the 
severity of punishment could be contextualized as a tangible consequence, while the ten-
point threshold for each reward was chosen to limit the amount of candy that would need 
to be distributed. 
Short Dark Triad 
To measure Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism, a validated 
questionnaire was used (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). The questionnaire had 9 questions for 
each of the three personality traits, and asked participants to answer each using a five 
item Likert scale. 
Analysis 
 A within subjects repeated measures 2x2 ANOVA was conducted on the data, 
with the lies per hit ratio (LpH) as the variable and certainty and severity as the factor. 
Linear regression was performed on the dark triad and each player’s the average LpH as 
an exploratory analysis. For a rough comparison of reliability, the means of dark triad 
scores were compared to those of previous studies that provided descriptive statistics of 
mean, standard deviation, and that were separated by gender. The first set of means come 
from the initial creation of the short dark triad, both come from the validation portion of 
the creation process after the short dark triad test had been completed (Jones & Paulhus, 
2014). The first study had 279 participants with 46% being female, the second had 230 
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participants with 58% being female. Further demographic data was not reported. The 
second set of means comes from a study that compared the short dark triad to the 
HEXACO personality test (Book, Visser, & Volk 2015). The first study had 355 
participants with 68% being female, the second had 325 participants with 64% being 
female. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The high certainty low severity (HL) condition had the lowest mean of lies per hits (M = 
.325, SD = .262), followed by HH (M = .358, SD = .272), LH (M = .440, SD = .33), and 
finally LL with the highest mean (M = .550, SD = .308). An alpha value of .05 was used 
for all statistical tests. The means of each condition with can be seen in figure 1, with 
error bars at 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Figure 1 
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A mixed factor analysis was used, comparing the effects of certainty and severity as well 
as the interaction effect of certainty and severity on the ratio of lies per hit. A main effect 
was found for certainty F(1,29) = 8.95, p = .006, η2 = .236. No main effect was found for 
severity F(1,29) = .705, p = .408, η2 = .024,  and no interaction effect was found F(1,29) 
= 2.38, p = .134. η2 =  .076. 
 Descriptive statistics were generated for the dark triad traits and grouped by 
gender. Machiavellianism measured at (M = 3.45, SD = 0.52) and (M = 2.72, SD = 0.81) 
for males and females respectively, (M = 2.79, SD = 0.41) and (M = 2.75, SD = 0.41) for 
narcissism, and (M = 2.24, SD = 0.64) and (M = 1.68, SD = .40) for psychopathy. Simple 
linear regressions were run on the average lies per hit across conditions and each of the 
three dark triad traits and showed no clear relationship. This can be seen in figures 2-4. 
The same analysis was conducted on each condition compared and each of the dark triad; 
these were similarly devoid of pattern (See Appendix A). Gender delineated dark triad 
mean comparison graphs were generated (See Appendix B). 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 4 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
The study examined whether the likelihood of discovery or the penalty upon capture is 
greater at preventing deception. As analyses revealed, certainty has a significant effect on 
a person’s likelihood to lie while severity does not. This is in line with the majority 
opinion within the literature and thus supports the hypothesis. One reason why the 
findings do not coincide with the more niche views is because the methodology is so 
much different. Silberman (1976) used a self-report crime inventory of college student 
and a complex correlation analysis to explore certainty and severity. His findings 
suggested that those with high levels of criminality would only be deterred from extreme 
crimes by high severity, which is untestable in a behavioral context. Mendes (2004) was 
critical of the severity and certainty framework and conducted an algebraic analysis on an 
older certainty and severity model. She found that months served for robbery had a 
deterrent effect, while arrests and convictions do not. She argued that all three 
components must exist for crime to be deterred, and that criminals combine the risk 
components. Her method differs sharply from the one used by this study, as it is not a 
behavioral one. 
The dark triad means appear to be roughly in line with previous research (See 
Appendix B), and it would be difficult to make any hard conclusions due to the relatively 
low sample size. Exploratory analysis failed to uncover any obvious trends on 
participants’ lies per hit, which was unexpected given that previous studies have found 
relationships between elements of the dark triad and the rate of deception (Jones & 
Paulhus, 2017; Palomäki, Yan, & Laakasuo, 2016). It would be unsurprising if for 
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instance high scorers in Machiavellianism and psychopathy were found to lie more 
frequently in general, but that does not appear to be the case here (Jones & Paulhus, 
2017). The likely explanation here is sample size; this study had a sample of 30 
participants, while the studies that found significance in this area had sample sizes 
numbering in the hundreds. This of course allows for a more accurate analysis. 
Limitations 
Although there were significant effects found between the variable evaluated, 
there are several limitations to acknowledge. Foremost is the sample size, a sample size 
larger than 30 may have given more accurate results. The behavioral study conducted by 
Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) used a sample size of 256, however they used a between-
subjects design while this study used a within-subjects design which gives this study 
additional power. While severity proved to be insignificant as a deterrent it may be the 
case that it may become significant with a larger sample size. The dark triad also may 
have shown a better trend if a larger sample size were obtained, as the psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism did not have a positive relationship with frequency of lies as expected. 
(Jones & Paulhus, 2017). 
In retrospect, revealing the board after every turn may have influenced the 
likelihood of calling in an unrealistic way, allowing for more rapport building through the 
proof of truths and potentially making lies more difficult. There are certainly many real-
world scenarios where proof of truths and lies cannot be affirmed. Significance was still 
found under these conditions even if there was a stifling effect on deception, so this 
limitation is likely not severe. Not randomly assigning a player their space to be shot at 
had pros and cons. The intention was to allow an element of strategy into the game as 
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deception does have strategic elements, however leaving strategy uncontrolled may skew 
results. For instance, it may be the case that players are slightly better or worse at calling 
lies that are predicated on user placement of their game piece as opposed to randomized 
ones. 
It is impossible to decouple risk from reward, as a motivation needs to be in place 
for most people to commit deceptive act. An option that was considered would have been 
to make reward a constant value, five points for successful bluffs in all versions of the 
game. It was decided that reward should be tied to severity, as the severity of the 
punishment tends to roughly coincide with the severity of the crime in real life. This 
choice created realism in the study but may have introduced a confounding variable. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the risk and reward matters; deceiving in a game context 
with the goal of earning candy is very different than deceiving with the goal of stealing a 
car, government secrets, or a great deal of money. The test environment was very low 
stakes and candy is a very light reward, however crime often comes with a high reward 
that is further amplified by factors like income (Grogger, 1981). It would be unethical to 
properly replicate those severe conditions, however a more significant reward such as a 
cash prize may have had more validity. 
Future Research 
 Even with those limitations considered, Nictacs game has produced promising 
results data, and with proper tuning and validation could prove useful in further 
behavioral studies of certainty and severity. It also created a relatively easy data 
recording environment while still retaining a high level of behavioral complexity; further 
research could adapt it to study rapport building, calling behaviors and relationships, etc. 
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A similar study with a larger sample size would of course be extremely valuable. Future 
studies could also include variations on the risk and reward; collecting data when high 
and low severity is at 2 and 8 as well as 3 and 7 could allow researchers to thresholds of 
willingness to lie or other patterns. 
There was no significance found in either the effect of severity or from the 
certainty/severity interaction effect on lies per hit; however, if the means from this study 
held true under a larger sample size, it could conceivably uncover a smaller but 
significant effect for those two factors.  
Finally, a wizard of oz style study using Nictacs as a base could prove valuable by 
controlling exactly when a shot would hit and the frequency of called lies. This would 
help control variance by giving each participant the exact same experience. 
Conclusion 
This study set out to determine whether certainty was a greater deterrent to crime 
than severity and found that this was indeed the case. This supports the majority view 
within the literature. Furthermore, the study shows that the majority conclusion replicates 
in the context of repeated interaction. This suggests that increasing the perceived 
likelihood of capture may be the best route in deterring deceptive behavior when there is 
the opportunity for repeated deception, such as scams, cybercrime, etc. An unexplored 
but extremely important factor in low latency deception is that of perceptual instability. It 
has been shown that perceptions of risk change over time; for example, people that get 
away with writing bad checks are more likely to decrease their estimation of risk over a 
one-year period than those that have not (Paternoster, 1987). Evaluating low latency 
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perception changes in the context of varying certainty and severity appears to be the next 
logical step in research. 
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APPENDIX B 
GENDER DELINEATED DARK TRIAD MEAN COMPARISONS 
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